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INSURANCE LAW
Terrence L. Graves*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will summarize and discuss case decisions and
statutory changes in the field of insurance law that have taken
place over the last two years. As in years past, most of the
cases involve automobile coverage, particularly uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage. Other areas covered by this
article include the following: liability insurance, automobile
medical payments coverage, insurance regulation, fire insur-
ance, and homeowners 'insurance.
II. UNINSURED ("UM") AND UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST ("(JWI) COVERAGE.
A. UM Coverage for Actions of Carjacker
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Huston v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., looked at the
question of whether or not the actions of a carjacker fell within
the definition of "use" of a vehicle for purposes of providing
uninsured motorist coverage.1 The case arose out of an incident
in which Huston was killed during an attempted carjacking of
his vehicle. He was shot twice by the caijacker and subsequent-
ly died from his wounds.2 This case initially was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as a
declaratory judgment action in which the administrator of
Huston's estate sought a ruling that Huston's injuries arose out
* Associate, Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. BA.,
cum laude, 1986, Howard University; J.D., 1991, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. 99 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996).
2. See id. at 133.
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of the use of the vehicle by an uninsured motorist. The district
court, however, granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.3
Huston's estate appealed the case to the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit certified to the Supreme
Court of Virginia the question of "whether or not Huston's
injuries arose out of the use of the automobile within the mean-
ing of the policy of insurance."4 The Supreme Court of Virginia
declined to accept the certified question; however, the court
stated in its denial order that there was "nothing in the pres-
ent case [that] distinguishes it from Lexie v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co."5 The supreme court decided in Lexie
that uninsured motorist coverage is not applicable where the
conduct of an assailant, in causing the death of a motorist, does
not constitute use of a vehicle as contemplated by the unin-
sured motorist statute or the uninsured motorist provisions of
the insurance policy in question.6
The supreme court's statement in its denial order further
points out that criminal acts which take place while the actor
is occupying a vehicle generally will not be considered "use" of
the vehicle as contemplated by the uninsured motorist statute
or the provisions of policies of insurance sold in Virginia.
B. UM Coverage for Student Crossing Street to Board School
Bus
The Supreme Court of Virginia answered two other certified
questions from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Stern v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.7 This case involved an acci-
dent in which a ten-year-old girl, Elena Stern, was injured as
she crossed the street to board a school bus. The bus was
stopped with its flashing lights activated. The girl was struck
by an oncoming car.8
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing 251 Va. 390, 469 S.E.2d 61 (1996)).
6. See Lexie, 251 Va. at 392, 469 S.E.2d at 62.
7. 252 Va. 307, 477 S.E.2d 517 (1996).
8. See id. at 309, 477 S.E.2d at 518.
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The car was operated by David Demoss and was insured by
an insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company.
The policy had liability limits of $25,000 per person with a
total maximum payout of $50,000.9 Elena's parents were in-
sured by State Farm Insurance Company. This policy had lia-
bility limits of $100,000 per person, and because Elena was a
resident of her parents' household, she was insured under the
underinsured motorist coverage of that policy.10 The school bus
was owned and operated by the City of Lynchburg and was
insured under a policy issued by Graphic Arts Insurance Com-
pany, which provided underinsured motorist coverage in the
amount of $1,000,000 to individuals who fit within the defini-
tion of "insured."" The Graphic Arts policy defined "insured"
to include those who are injured while "occupying" a covered
vehicle. The policy then defined "occupying" as "in, upon, get-
ting in, on, out or off."2
The supreme court discussed the provisions of Virginia Code
section 38.2-2206,"a which is applicable to the use of a vehicle.
Specifically, section 38.2-2206 provides that coverage is afforded
to an individual who "uses" the motor vehicle to' which the
policy applies with the expressed or implied consent of the
named insured. 4
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered the following two
certified questions from the Fourth Circuit: "(1) Was [Elena]
'occupying' the school bus, as that term is defined in the Graph-
ic Arts policy, when she was injured?; [and] (2) Was [Elena]
'using' the school bus, as that term is defined in Virginia Code
.Ann. § 38.2-2206, when she was injured?"15
The supreme court answered the first certified question in
the negative, stating that the child was not "occupying" the bus
9. See id.
10. See id. at 310, 477 S.E.2d at 518.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
14. See id.
15. Stern, 252 Va. at 310, 477 S.E.2d at 518.
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as defined in the Graphic Arts policy.'" The court found that
at best, Elena was "merely approaching the bus" at the time of
the accident."
The court also answered the second certified question in the
negative. The court indicated that at the time of this accident,
"Elena clearly was not utilizing the bus as a vehicle because
she was not yet a passenger of the school bus and, therefore,
was not using the bus, within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206,
when she was injured." 8 The court further held that the
Graphic Arts policy did not provide coverage to the Sterns. 9
The court distinguished the present case from Great American
Insurance v. Cassell, stating that in Cassell, the firefighter
who was killed was still using the fire truck to extinguish the
fire and control traffic at the time the accident occurred."'
The court followed its holding and reasoning in Insurance
Company v. Perry' and United States Fire Insurance Co. v.
Parker." Perry and Parker both involved situations in which
the erstwhile users or occupants of the vehicles in question
were involved in accidents while outside the vehicles.' 4 The
court found that neither of the accident victims in Perry nor
Parker were actually "utilizing" or "using" their vehicles when
they were struck.'
C. UM Coverage for an Employee
In Stone v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia answered another certified question from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The question was
16. See id. at 311, 477 S.E.2d at 519.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 520.
19. See id.
20. 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476 (1990).
21. See Stern, 252 Va. at 312, 477 S.E.2d at 520 (citing Cassell, 239 Va. at 424,
389 S.E.2d at 477).
22. 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
23. 250 Va. 374, 463 S.E.2d 464 (1995).
24. See Stern, 252 Va. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 520 (citing Parker, 250 Va. at 378,
463 S.E.2d at 466; Perry, 204 Va. at 838, 134 S.E.2d at 421).
25. See id. at 312-13, 477 S.E.2d at 520.
26. 253 Va. 12, 478 S.E.2d 883 (1997).
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whether, under the facts presented, Thomas Stone was an in-
sured person as defined in Virginia Code section 38.2-
2206(B).' In other words, does section 38.2-2206(B) mandate
that Stone is insured under the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment of his employer's automobile policy notwithstanding the
policy language?28
This case arose out of an automobile accident between Thom-
as Stone and Carol Drye, which occurred while Stone was driv-
ing his personally owned vehicle during the course of his em-
ployment with Tidewater Pizza, Inc. Stone was a pizza delivery
person and was required to provide his own transportation.'
Stone eventually recovered a judgment against Drye in the
amount of $250,000, plus interests and costs, following a trial
in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court.3 0 Drye's liability insurance
had a limit of $25,000 at the time of the accident; therefore,
that amount was all that was available to satisfy the judg-
ment.31
At the time of the accident, Tidewater Pizza, Inc. was in-
sured by a business auto insurance policy issued by Liberty
Mutual. Tidewater Pizza, Inc. was the named insured and was
covered by motor vehicle liability insurance with a limit of
$350,000 and uninsured motorist coverage with a limit of
$350,000.32
Stone subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the
Virginia Beach Circuit Court against Liberty Mutual, which
was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia.' This declaratory judgment action sought a ruling
that the insurer was liable to Stone under the .underinsured
motorist coverage in the amount of $225,000.3 The parties
agreed to stipulate to the facts and to submit the issue of cov-
erage under the policy to the district court on cross-motions for
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
28. See Stone, 253 Va. at 16, 478 S.E.2d at 885.
29. See id. at 14, 478 S.E.2d at 883.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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summary judgment.35 The district court agreed with Stone's
argument that the policy issued to Tidewater conflicted with
Virginia Code section 38.2-2206, the uninsured motorist statute,
and granted Stone's motion for summary judgment.36 An ap-
peal was filed with the Fourth Circuit, which then certified the
question presented to the supreme court.3"
The supreme court analyzed the language of the policy in
question in light of the facts of this particular case and the re-
quirements of Virginia Code section 38.2-2206. Specifically, the
supreme court determined whether Stone qualified as an "in-
sured" under the uninsured motorist coverage provision of the
policy.38 Particular emphasis was placed on the two classes of
potential insureds. The uninsured motorist endorsement provid-
ed that
the term "insured" is defined as the named insured (Tide-
water) "or any family member" of the named insured. Sec-
ond, the term "insured" includes "[a]nyone else occupying a
covered auto" .... [A] "covered auto" is defined to include
"[o]nly those autos [Tidewater owns] which, because of the
law in the state where they are licensed or principally ga-
raged, are required to have and cannot reject uninsured
motorists insurance." 9
Two vehicles met this definition, and Stone's vehicle was not
one of them.4 °
Stone argued that he was operating a vehicle that was cov-
ered under the liability provision of the Liberty Mutual poli-
cy.4' Therefore, according to Stone, the insurer was required to
provide him with uninsured motorist coverage42 pursuant to
Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(A).' Stone also argued that
35. See id.
36. See id. at 14, 478 S.E.2d at 884.
37. See id. at 15, 478 S.E.2d at 884.
38. See id. at 16, 478 S.E.2d at 885.
39. Id. at 15, 478 S.E.2d at 884.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 16, 478 S.E.2d at 884.
42. See id., 478 S.E.2d at 885.
43. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(A) provides in pertinent part:
no policy or contract of bodily injury or property damage liability insur-
ance relating to the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
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the Liberty Mutual policy violated Virginia Code section 38.2-
2206(A) because it specifically provided coverage for non-owned
vehicles under the liability provision of the policy while failing
"to provide uninsured motorist coverage to anyone occupying
the same non-owned vehicle."'
The supreme court reasoned that Stone was not using either
of the motor vehicles covered by the policy because he was
driving his own vehicle at the time of the accident." The court
focused on subsection (B) of the uninsured motorist statute4 s
and subsequently determined that Stone did not fit within any
of the described classes of insureds under the statute.4' Conse-
quently, the supreme court answered the certified question by
finding that Stone was not an "insured.'4
D. Calculating UIM Coverage in Single Car Accidents
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Trisvan v. Agway Insur-
ance Co., addressed the issue of "whether, in a single vehicle
accident, the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) en-
dorsement of a tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance policy
is to be considered when determining the extent to which the
tortfeasor's motor vehicle is underinsured."49 Trisvan was a
shall be issued or delivered in this Commonwealth to the owner of such
vehicle or shall be issued or delivered by any insurer licensed in this
Commonwealth upon any motor vehicle principally garaged or used in
this Commonwealth unless it contains an endorsement or provisions un-
dertaking to pay the insured all sums that he is legally entitled to recov-
er as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehi-
cle ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
44. Stone, 253 Va. at 16, 478 S.E.2d at 885.
45. See id. at 18, 478 S.E.2d at 886.
46. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B) provides in pertinent part:
"Insured" as used in subsection A ... of this section means the named
insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of the
named insured, and relatives, wards or foster children of either, while in
a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses the motor vehicle
to which the policy applies, with the expressed or implied consent of the
named insured, and a guest in the motor vehicle to which the policy
applies or the personal representative of any of the above.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
47. See Stone, 253 Va. at 18, 478 S.E.2d. at 886.
48. See id. at 19, 478 S.E.2d at 886.
49. 254 Va. 416, 417, 492 S.E.2d 628, 628 (1997).
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passenger in a vehicle driven by Marcus Smith. The vehicle
was involved in a single car accident, and Trisvan suffered inju-
ries resulting in more than $125,000 in damages. Smith's vehi-
cle was insured by an insurance policy with a limit of $25,000
per person. Trisvan, however, was an insured under a family
automobile policy issued by Agway with a limit of $100,000 for
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Trisvan sued Smith
for personal injuries suffered, and Agway was served as the
underinsured motorist carrier for Trisvan. The suit was settled
when Smith's liability carrier paid Trisvan the limits of that
policy and when Agway tendered $75,000.50
Agway then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
determination that $75,000 was the maximum extent of its
underinsurance obligation. Trisvan argued that the total
amount of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage available
was $125,000, thereby making Agway's total liability $100,000
instead of $75,000."' The trial court determined that Smith's
vehicle was underinsured in the amount of $75,000; consequent-
ly, Trisvan was only entitled to $75,000, not $100,000 as he
had argued."
Trisvan asserted that Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B)53
requires that, in a single car accident, the tortfeasor's unin-
sured/underinsured motorist coverage always be stacked onto
other available uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.'
This construction requires that the driver's, unin-
sured/underinsured motorist coverage be provided to his passen-
gers, even if the driver is the sole tortfeasor.5 Trisvan argued
that the purpose of the 1982 amendments to Virginia Code
section 38.2-2206 was to "increase the total protection afforded"
50. See id. at 418, 492 S.E.2d at 628.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. The pertinent portion of Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B) provides:
[a] motor vehicle is "underinsured" when, and to the extent that, the
total amount of bodily injury and property damage coverage applicable to
the operation or use of the motor vehicle and available for payment for
such bodily injury or property damage . . . is less than the total amount
of uninsured motorist coverage afforded any person injured as a result of
the operation or use of the vehicle.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
54. See Trisvan 254 Va. at 419, 492 S.E.2d at 629.
55. See id.
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to parties injured by the negligence of motorists." The su-
preme court disagreed, explaining that the purpose of the 1982
amendments was to allow an injured person "access to the
'over-insurance' in his uninsured/underinsured motorist insur-
ance endorsement, even if the tortfeasor was insured."57 The
supreme court afired the trial court, stating that "in applying
section 38.2-2206(B), a passenger injured in a single vehicle
accident is not entitled to include the UM/UIM coverage con-
tained in the tortfeasor's automobile liability insurance policy
when determining the extent to which the tortfeasor's vehicle
was underinsured."8
Notably, Justices Compton and Kinser, in a concurring opin-
ion, analyze the case in a way that most practicing attorneys
would analyze it. The Justices determined that the $25,000 in
uninsured motorist coverage available from Smith's policy can
not be added when computing "the total amount" of "coverage"
referred to in the uninsured motorist statute in order to deter-
mine the extent to which the claimant's vehicle was underin-
sured.59 In other words, the tortfeasor's underinsured motorist
coverage is not considered, and the amount of liability insur-
ance is subtracted from the remaining underinsured motorist
coverage available, leaving one with the amount that the vehi-
cle is underinsured.
E. UIM Coverage for Employment Functions of Automobiles
The Supreme Court of Virginia examined the purpose of a
vehicle, the equipment that it utilized, and its relationship to
the employee's job in Randall v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co." The issue in Randall was "whether, for purposes of qual-
ifying as an insured under Code section 38.2-2206, a highway
56. Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 234 Va. 573, 363 S.E.2d 703
(1988)).
57. Id Scott explained that an anomaly existed that allowed a person who was
injured by an uninsured motorist to recover greater monetary damages than if the
person was injured by someone who was insured, and the injured party had elected
to obtain uninsured motorist coverage in an amount greater than the liability limits
of the insured tortfeasor. See 234 Va. at 575-76, 363 S.E.2d at 704.
58. Trisvan, 254 Va at 420, 492 S.E.2d at 630.
59. See id at 422, 492 S.E.2d at 631 (Compton, J., concurring).
60. 255 Va. 62, 496 S.E.2d 54 (1998).
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worker was 'using' his employer's vehicle while placing lane
closure signs along the side of a highway."6 James L. Downey
and another employee were putting lane closure signs along a
portion of Interstate 64 ("1-64") during the course of, and in the
scope of, their employment with Archer-Western Contractors,
Ltd. when Downey was struck and killed by a car driven by
Thomas Pasterczyk.62
Downey and his fellow employee followed a certain procedure
while placing the lane closure signs along the highway. They
drove company owned pickup trucks and stopped at several
points along a one-mile stretch of 1-64. While stopped, Downey
and the other employee would leave the engines of the vehicles
running and the truck's yellow flashing bubble lights turned on.
Downey would remove the lane closure signs from the rear of
the vehicle and place them six feet from the rear of the
truck.
The administrators of Downey's estate filed a motion for
judgment against Pasterczyk for wrongful death.' Before trial
the parties agreed to have a judgment entered against
Pasterczyk in the amount of $105,000, of which $60,000 would
be paid jointly by Pasterczyk's liability carrier and Downey's
uninsured/underinsurance motorist carrier.65
The trial court determined Downey's estate was not entitled
to recover under the uninsured/underinsured motorist endorse-
ment of the Liberty Mutual policy that covered the Archer-
Western vehicle even though the estate argued that Downey
was "using" said vehicle at the time of his death.6' The trial
court specifically found that Downey was not using or occupying
the vehicle in question at the time of the accident.67
The estate appealed the trial court's decision. The supreme
court reversed the trial court, relying in part upon its previous
61. Id. at 63-64, 496 S.E.2d at 54.
62. See id. at 64, 496 S.E.2d at 54-55.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. The parties presumably agreed to have judgment entered to satisfy
the requirement in most policies that UM/UIM coverage only be paid when the
tortfeasor legally is obligated to pay.
66. See id. at 65, 496 S.E.2d at 55.
67. See id.
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holding in Great American Insurance Co. v. Cassell.' As in
Cassell, the supreme court found that Downey was using his
employer's vehicle at the time of his death.69 The supreme
court also indicated that it was important that the vehicle that
Downey was using was a specialized vehicle with warning
equipment. This allowed the supreme court to distinguish the
current case from its prior decision in United States Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Parker.7 The supreme court's decision in this case
seems to suggest that the court places great importance upon
the type of vehicle that purportedly is being "used" by the per-
son who is seeking the benefit of the uninsured/underinsured
coverage. This decision, however, cannot be reconciled with the
supreme court's previously discussed decision in Stern.7" The
difficulty in reconciling the finding in Stern with the finding in
Randall is recognized in the dissent by Justices Hassell, Lacy,
and Keenan in the Stern case. 73
F. UIM Credit Priorities
The Supreme Court of Virginia looked at the issue of wheth-
er or not Virginia Code section 46.2-368(B)74 modified the cred-
it priorities of Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B)7' in Catron v.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.7" Catron was injured in an
automobile collision with another vehicle, driven by Brian Lay-
man. Catron was employed by Roanoke County at the time of
this accident, and he was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment at the time that the accident occurred. Layman was pro-
vided liability coverage by Rockingham Casualty Company with
68. See id. at 65-68, 496 S.E.2d at 55-57 (citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Cassell,
239 Va. 431, 389 S.E.2d 476 (1990).
69. See id. at 67, 496 S.E.2d at 57.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 67, 496 S.E.2d at 57 (citing United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Parker,
250 Va. 378, 463 S.E.2d 464 (1995)).
72. Stern v. Cincinnati Inc., 252 Va. 307, 477 S.E.2d 517 (1996).
73. See id. at 313-14, 477 S.E.2d at 520-21 (Hassell, J., dissenting). Specifically,
the dissent felt that under the policy in question, the infant plaintiff was "occupying"
the school bus in that she was in the act of "getting on" the bus at the time of the
accident. See id. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 520.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-368(B) (Curn. Supp. 1997).
75. Id. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
76. 255 Va. 31, 496 S.E.2d 436 (1998).
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a limit of $100,000. Catron was provided underinsured motorist
coverage by State Farm with a limit of $100,000. Roanoke
County was self-insured for uninsured motorist coverage pur-
poses in the amount of $25,000. Layman's liability carrier of-
fered its maximum liability coverage to Catron in settlement of
the case, and Roanoke County claimed that it was entitled to
the proceeds of the settlement offer because it paid workers
compensation benefits to Catron following the accident."
A declaratory judgment action was filed by Catron, seeking a
ruling that State Farm was obligated to pay him $25,000 due
to the applicable priority of underinsured coverage in the
case. 8 The trial court held that the underinsured motorist cov-
erage of State Farm was primary and that it owed no payment
to Catron 9 Furthermore, the court held that the county's self-
insured coverage was secondary." The trial court apparently
based its holdings upon its understanding of the provisions of
Virginia Code sections 38.2-2206(B) and 46.2-368(B)."1
The supreme court reversed the trial court's rulings and
entered final judgment for Catron, holding that the lower court
erred in finding that Virginia Code section 46.2-368(B) modified
77. See id. at 34, 496 S.E.2d at 437.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B) provides in pertinent part:
[i]f an injured person is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under
more than one policy, the following order of priority of policies applies
and any amount available for payment shall be credited against such
policies in the following order of priority: (1) The policy covering a motor
vehicle occupied by the injured person at the time of the accident; (2)
The policy covering a motor vehicle not involved in the accident under
which the injured person is a named insured; (3) The policy covering a
motor vehicle not involved in the accident under which the injured per-
son is an insured other than a named insured. Where there is more than
one insurer providing coverage under one of the payment priorities set
forth, their liability shall be proportioned as to their respective underin-
sured motorist coverages.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998). Virginia Code section 46.2-368
states that the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles has the power to
issue certificates of self-insurance. The certificate must provide protection against an
uninsured or underinsured motorist "to the extent required by § 38.2-2206." The sec-
tion further provides that "protection against the uninsured or underinsured motorist"
is "secondary coverage." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-368(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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the credit priorities of section 38.2-2206.2 The supreme court
looked at the language of both statutes in question, stating that
section 38.2-2206 establishes an "order of priority of policies"
which indicates that the amount available for "payment" will be
"credited" against the several policies in "the following order of
priority:" the county's $25,000 which provided underinsured
motorist coverage to the county vehicle operated by Catron at
the time of the accident; then the $100,000 from State Farm's
policy covering a vehicle not involved in the accident under
which the plaintiff was a named insured.' Section 46.2-368(B)
provided that the "protection against the uninsured or underin-
sured motorist required under this section... shall be second-
ary coverage to any other valid and collectible insurance provid-
ing the same protection which is available to any person other-
wise entitled to assert a claim to such protection by virtue of
this section."' The supreme court noted that the General As-
sembly "recognized 'a distinction in the financial implications of
recovery from self-insurers and recovery from commercial insur-
ers,' and in effect has placed self-insurers in a favored sta-
tus. 5 The supreme court stated that "the General Assembly
has not specified that the 'secondary language' in 368 modifies
the credit priority design of 2206.""s Specifically, the court
notes that the words "credit" and "priority" are not used in
46.2-368." This supreme court decision clarified an area of
confusion as to whether or not Virginia Code section 46.2-368
overrides or reverses the priorities of credit and payment set
out in section 38.2-2206.
G. Statutory Changes
The 1997 General Assembly amended the uninsured/under-
insured motorist statute to include as an "uninsured motor
vehicle" any motor vehicle owned or operated by an individual
immune from liability for negligence under state or federal
82. See Catron, 255 Va. at 39, 496 S.E.2d at 440.
83. See id. at 38, 496 S.E.2d at 439.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-368(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
85. Id. (quoting William v. City of Newport News, 240 Va. 425, 432, 397 S.E.2d
813, 817 (1990)).
86. Id.
87. See id.
1998] 1315
1316 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1303
law." The bill further provides that such immunity does not
bar an insured claimant from obtaining a judgment against his
own insurer under the uninsured motorist provisions of his own
insurance policy. 9 The insurer may not raise this immunity as
a defense to its insured's uninsured motorist claim.0
III. AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY COVERAGE
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia has not handed
down any decisions within the last two years in the area of
automobile liability insurance. The circuit court judges, howev-
er, have provided some interesting opinions covering the omni-
bus clause, material representations, and violation of lease
agreements by lessees.
A. Omnibus Clause
Judge Bach of the Fairfax Circuit Court addressed the ques-
tion of implied permissive use relative to the omnibus clause in
USAA v. Nationwide Insurance Co.91 The court was asked to
determine whether Christopher Rampe, a co-plaintiff along with
USAA, was a permissive user as contemplated by Virginia Code
88. See H.B. 2501, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997) (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998)).
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cune. Supp. 1998).
90. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(F) was amended to provide:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, the immunity from lia-
bility for negligence of the owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not
be a bar to the insured obtaining a judgment enforceable against the
insurer for the negligence of the immune owner or operator, and shall
not be a defense available to the insurer to the action brought by the in-
sured- which shall proceed against the named defendant although any
judgment obtained would be enforceable against the insurer and any
other nonimmune defendant. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the
owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle from employing counsel
of his own choice and taking any action in his own interest in connection
with the proceeding.
Id. § 38.2-2206(F) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
91. 41 Va. Cir. 370 (Fairfax County 1997).
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section 38.2-220492 and, subsequently, if Nationwide was obli-
gated to provide liability coverage to Rampe.93
A declaratory judgment action was filed by Rampe and USAA
which alleged that Rampe was given express permission by
Tom Dix, III to operate a vehicle that was insured by Nation-
wide or in the alternative that Rampe had implied permission
to operate the vehicle. Nationwide's named insured was Tom
Dix. The court found that Rampe "was not given express per-
mission to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident.1 4
The court also found that Tom Dix, III did not have any right
to give Rampe permission to drive the vehicle and that Dix, III
did not have general control over the vehicle." Judge Bach
then turned to the issue of implied permission in his opinion.
Specifically, Judge Bach relied upon the language of the
Supreme Court of Virginia in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Cook, stating that "implied permission may 'arise from either
a course of conduct or relationship between the parties, in
which there is mutual acquiescence or a lack of objection under
circumstances signifying assent.'"" Recognizing that each case
must be analyzed upon its own specific facts to determine the
existence of permission, Judge Bach looked at the facts of the
present case and determined that the Dixes did not give Rampe
92. Virginia Code section 38.2-2204(A) provides that:
[n]o policy or contract of bodily injury or property damage liability insur-
ance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use
of any motor vehicle . . . shall be issued or delivered . . . unless the
policy contains a provision insuring the named insured, and any other
person using or responsible for the use of the motor vehicle . . . with the
expressed or implied consent of the named insured, against liability for
death or injury sustained .... Each such policy or contract of liability
insurance ... insuring private passenger automobiles. . . principally
garaged ... with respect to any liability insurance provided by the poli-
cy, contract or endorsement for use of a nonowned automobile : . . any
provision requiring permission or consent of the owner of such automo-
bile ... for the insurance to apply, shall be construed to include per-
mission or consent of the custodian in the provision requiring permission
or consent of the owner.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(A) (Cur. Supp. 1998).
93. See USAA, 41 Va. Cir. at 370.
94. Id.
95. See id-
96. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 186 Va. 658, 667, 43 S.E.2d
863, 867 (1947)).
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express or implied permission to use the vehicle, that Rampe
was, therefore, not an insured under Nationwide's policy, and
that Nationwide had no obligation under its policy to insure
Rampe for damages arising out of the underlying automobile
accident. 7 The court determined that no relationship or course
of conduct existed between the Dixes and Rampe that could
establish permissive use. 8 In fact, the evidence indicated that
Rampe had obtained express permission each time he borrowed
the vehicle in the past.99
The Virginia Beach Circuit Court also addressed coverage
under the omnibus clause in 1997. In Jaynes v.. Haigh, the
Virginia Beach Circuit Court determined that liability coverage
founded upon the omnibus clause is extended to lessees of an
insured vehicle and that any contract providing the contrary is
void.'00 The court, however, noted that coverage can be limited
by the garage keepers exception.' 01
This case arose out of an automobile accident between the
defendant Haigh, who was driving a leased Ford pickup truck,
and four West Virginia University students occupying another
vehicle. The case was filed as a declaratory judgment action
seeking a determination that liability insurance coverage was
available for this particular accident under an insurance policy
issued by defendant, Michigan Mutual Insurance Company.0 2
The pickup truck driven by Haigh was leased from a local Ford
dealership and the terms of the lease required Haigh to carry
liability insurance on the vehicle. Haigh's liability insurance,
however, had been canceled for non-payment of premiums ap-
proximately two months prior to the accident.0 3
The lease and all of the interest held in the vehicle by the
local dealership was assigned to Ford Motor Credit Company
("Ford Credit"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Com-
pany. A commercial automobile policy with a limit of
$12,000,000 issued to Ford Motor Company as the 'primary
97. See id. at 371.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See 42 Va. Cir. 125 (Va. Beach City 1997).
101. Id. at 129-30.
102. See id. at 125.
103. See id. at 126.
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named insured was in effect at the time of the accident. The
term "named insured" was further defined in an endorsement
as "Ford Motor Company, its subsidiary, associated and affiliat-
ed companies, and its owned or controlled companies as are
now or may thereafter be constituted.""°
Judge Shockley analyzed Virginia Code sections 38.2-2204(A)
and (D) and determined that because Haigh was, for all intents
and purposes, a permissive user of the vehicle covered by the
Michigan Mutual policy, Michigan Mutual had to provide him
with coverage under the policy in question. 5 The policy also
-had a clause which stated: "No coverage is afforded to the les-
sees of autos unless otherwise provided by endorsement or
required by statute or law.""° Judge Shockley specifically
found that this clause was void pursuant to Virginia Code sec-
tion 38.2-2204(D). 0 7
The other issue considered by the court was whether the
"garage keepers" exception, as codified in Virginia Code section
38.2-2205,"° limited the amount of liability coverage, which
104. Id.
105. See id. at 127-28.
106. Id. at 127.
107. See id.
108. Virginia Code section 38.2-2205 provides in pertinent part:
Each policy or contract or bodily injury or property damage liability
insurance which provides insurance to a named insured in connection
with the business of selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing or park-
ing motor vehicles, against liability arising from the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of any motor vehicle incident thereto shall contain a pro-
vision that the insurance coverage applicable to those motor -vehicles
shall not be applicable to at person other than a named insured and his
employees in the course of their employment if there is any other valid
and collectible insurance applicable to the same loss covering -the other
person under a policy with limits at least equal to the financial respon-
sibility requirements specified in section 46.2-472. Such provision shall
apply to motor vehicles which are either for the purpose of demonstrating
to the other person as a prospective purchaser, or which are loaned or
leased to the other person as a convenience during the repairing or ser-
vicing of a motor vehicle for the other person, or leased to the other
person for a period of six months or more . ...
If there is no other valid and collectible insurance available, the
coverage under such policy afforded a person, other than the named
insured and his employees in the course of their employment, shall be
applicable, but the amount recoverable in such case shall not exceed the
financial responsibility requirements specified in section 46.2-472.
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was available to the plaintiffs in this case, to the statutory
minimum limits provided for in Virginia Code section 46.2-472
($25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident).19 The court closely
analyzed whether Ford Credit was a "garage keeper" or wheth-
er it was in the business of financing vehicles."0 The court
concluded that Ford Credit actually became the "lessor of the
vehicles, not just a financial backer" and was, therefore, covered
by the "garage keeper" exception."' Therefore, the liability
limits applicable to this accident were the minimum statutory
limits provided for in Virginia Code section 46.2-472.112
The omnibus clause and its construction continues to be a
source of litigation in Virginia. As shown above, in most cases,
the outcome will be fact specific; consequently, the findings of
the circuit courts do not represent any recognizable trend.
B. Material Misrepresentations by Insured
In Heinzelman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,"' the Fairfax County Circuit Court determined whether
plaintiff Heinzelman made material misrepresentations in his
application for insurance which made the binder of insurance
void ab initio."' Heinzelman filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion seeking coverage from State Farm pursuant to a binder of
insurance that State Farm had issued but claimed was void due
to material misrepresentations that Heinzelman made on the
application for the policy."5
Heinzelman went into the office of an independent State
Farm agent on March 2, 1994, and provided information to one
of the employees who recorded it on the application.
Heinzelman was asked the following question: "During the past
five years have you, the applicant, any household member, or
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2205 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
109. See Jaynes, 42 Va. Cir. at 128.
110. See id. at 128-30.
111. Id. at 129.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-472 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
113. 41 Va. Cir. 505 (Fairfax County 1997).
114. See id.
115. See id.
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any regular driver... had an accident or sustained a loss?"116
Heinzelman answered this question in the negative. Although
half the premium was due, Heinzelman was unable to pay until
he received his paycheck on March 4, 1994. He was informed
that he would have no insurance coverage until the money was
paid and that the application would be held in a "pending
file.""7 Neither Heinzelman, nor the employee of the agency,
signed the binder."'
On March 4, 1994, at 2:30 a.m., Heinzelman was involved in
an automobile accident in which two people were injured.
Heinzelman went back to the agency office approximately elev-
en hours after the accident and, without telling anyone about
the accident, paid the premium and received a binder for insur-
ance which had an effective date of March 2, 1994. Heinzelman
represented to State Farm, when he signed the application, that
all of "[his] statements on [the] application [were] correct.""'
He reported the accident to State Farm on March 7, 1994.
State Farm investigated the circumstances surrounding the
accident and the issuance of the binder and unilaterally
changed the binder's effective date from March 2, 1994, to
March 4, 1994, at 1:00 p.m. State Farm issued a policy to
Heinzelman on March 24, 1994, covering the period from March
4, 1994, at 1:00 p.m. until October 10, 1994.121
Heinzelman argued that the binder was clear and unambigu-
ous and that State Farm could not use parole evidence to vary
its terms. He also argued that State Farm was barred from
alleging fraud because State Farm failed to plead fraud in its
Grounds of Defense, and because it issued an insurance policy
based upon an application that purportedly contained misrep-
resentations. Heinzelman relied upon Virginia Mutual Insur-
116. Id. at 506-07.
117. See id. at 507.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See id
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ance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 121 to support his
argument that State Farm waived any right to claim fraud.'
On the other hand, State Farm argued that there was no
coverage for the accident of March 4, 1994, and relied primarily
on Virginia Code section 38.2-3091" to support its conten-
tion."2
The court found that there was no coverage from State Farm
applicable to the March 4, 1994, accident."2 Furthermore, the
court held that the binder of insurance issued on March 4,
1994, was void ab initio because Heinzelman made a material
misrepresentation at the time he signed the application-he
knew he had been involved in an accident "less than twelve
hours earlier."
121
C. Violation of Lease Agreement by Lessee
In Martin v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 7 Judge
Johnson of the Richmond City Circuit Court decided the follow-
ing two issues: -
121. 204 Va. 783, 785, 790, 133 S.E.2d 277, 279, 283 (1963). The applicant for
insurance answered "no" in response to a question regarding whether any member of
his or her household had been denied a driver's license within the last five years
even though the applicant was aware that his wife had been denied a driver's license
twice in that time frame. The wife was involved in an accident, and during its inves-
tigation, State Farm discovered that the wife did not have a license to drive. Subse-
quently, State Farm issued a new policy covering a new vehicle purchased by the
applicant and his wife. State Farm then tried to rescind all policies issued to the
couple based upon material misrepresentations on the application for insurance. The
Supreme Court of Virginia held that State Farm could not show that the misstate-
ments were material to its decision to provide insurance because it had provided a
new policy to the couple even with the knowledge that the wife did not have a li-
cense prior to the rescission. See id.
122. See Heinzelman, 41 Va. Cir. at 507.
123. Virginia Code section 38.2-309 provides in pertinent part:
[a]ll statements, declarations, and descriptions in any application for an
insurance policy ... shall be deemed representations and not warranties.
No statement in an application . . . made before or after loss under the
policy shall bar recovery unless it is clearly proved that such an answer
or statement was material to the risk when assumed and was untrue.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-309 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
124. See Heinzelman, 41 Va. Cir. at 507-08.
125. See id. at 508.
126. Id.
127. 42 Va. Cir. 179 (Richmond City 1997).
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(1) whether a rental car agreement and/or Virginia Code
sections 38.2-2204 and 38.2-2206 require the rental com-
pany to provide insurance coverage for a traffic accident
which occurred while the rental car was being operated by
a person other than the rental car customer, with the rent-
al car customer's consent, but in violation of the rental car
agreement; and (2) whether the rental car customer's own
insurance carrier must provide coverage under the circum-
stances just stated.m
This case involved one car accident that injured three passen-
gers. At the time of the accident, the car was being driven by
Antonio Crews with the consent of Dawn Taylor. Taylor rented
the car from National Car Rental Systems ("National") subject
to the terms of its standard rental agreement. National was a
self-insured entity at the time of the accident, and Taylor was
the named insured under an insurance policy issued to her by
Colonial Insurance Company of California ("Colonial"). The
injured parties filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
ruling that coverage existed from either National or Colonial, or
both."
Judge Johnson examined the Colonial policy, the National
rental agreement, and the provisions of Virginia Code sections
38.2-2204 and 38.2-2206. Judge Johnson found that neither
liability nor uninsured motorist coverages were applicable to
the accident from either National or Colonial.3 0 The National
agreement clearly stated that any use of the vehicle by an
unauthorized user would make any liability insurance upon the
vehicle void.' Moreover, Judge Johnson found that Crews
128. Id. at 180.129. See id. at 179.
130. See id. at 181-86.
131. The National agreement provided in pertinent part:
I understand that if the vehicle is obtained or used for any prohibited
use or in violation of this agreement, then any limitation of my responsi-
bility under this agreement shall be void and I shall be fully responsible
for all loss and resulting damages, including loss of use, claims process-
ing fees, administrative charges, costs and attorneys' fees. Also, where
permitted by law, the . . . liability... insurance shall be void.
Additionally, it was provided in another part of the agreement
that: "I understand that protection does not apply to . . . any liability of
a driver who is not an Authorized Driver and any liability for an acci-
dent which occurs while the vehicle is obtained or used in violation of
this Agreement.
13231998]
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was clearly an unauthorized user due to the following factors:
(i) he was seventeen; (ii) he was unlicensed; (iii) he was not a
member of Taylor's family; (iv) he did not live with Taylor; (v)
he was not a business partner, employer, or regular fellow
employee; and (vi) he had not signed the rental agreement. 132
The court further held that there was no uninsured motorist
coverage available from National because the statutes spoke of
the "named insured," and the three injured individuals did not
qualify as "named insureds" or others to whom protection would
apply.13
Similarly, the court found that neither liability nor uninsured.
motorist coverage existed under the Colonial policy for the
accident."M Judge Johnson stated that because of the following
reasons, the language of the policy35 did not provide liability
coverage to Crews: (i) Crews was not a relative of Taylor, who
is the named insured; (ii) he did not have the permission of the
vehicle owner to operate the vehicle; and (iii) the mandatory
liability coverage provision of Virginia Code section 38.2-2204(C)
Authorized or Additional Authorized Drivers were defined in an-
other part of the agreement as "capable and validly licensed drivers, 25
years of age or older . .. ."
Authorized Drivers must be:
(1) a member of my immediate family who permanently lives with
me; or
(2) a business partner, employer or regular fellow employee who
drives the vehicle for business purposes.
Additional Authorized Drivers must be:
(1) a person who has signed the Rental document of this Agree-
ment as an Additional Authorized Driver after qualification by the Com-
pany.
Id. at 181.
132. See id. at 180.
133. See id. at 184.
134. See id. at 186.
135. The policy language provided as follows:
Persons Insured: the following are insureds under Part I . . . (b)
with respect to a non-owned automobile, (1) the named insured, (2) any
relative, but only with respect to a private passenger automobile or trail-
er, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) the other
actual use thereof is with the permission or reasonably believed to be
with the permission, of the owner and is within the scope of such per-
mission, and (3) any other person or organization not owning or hiring
the automobile, but only with respect to his or its liability because of
acts or omissions of an insured under (B)(1) or (2) above.
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is applicable only to the vehicle on which the policy was writ-
ten, which was Taylor's personal vehicle." 6 The mandatory
liability coverage was not applicable to the rental vehicle."'
The uninsured motorist coverage of the Colonial policy also was
found to be inapplicable because section 38.2-2206 only provided
coverage to individuals other than the named insured for "inju-
ries incurred while occupying or using the motor vehicle, to
which the policy applies.""
IV. LiABihrrY INSURANCE
A. Duty to Defend
In VEPCO v. Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance
Co., 39 the Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed the meaning of
the term "employee" in the context of a liability insurance poli-
cy. In addition, the supreme court evaluated whether a liability
insurer properly refused to provide defense to a named insured
by relying on a provision clause in the policy that excluded
coverage for personal injury suits filed by an "employee." "
VEPCO entered into a contract with Commercial Courier
Express ("Commercial") to provide courier services. The contract
required Commercial to obtain an addendum to its general lia-
bility policy with Northbrook, adding VEPCO as an additional
insured for suits arising out of courier services provided by
Commercial to VEPCO. The policy contained a clause that ex-
cluded coverage for suits "arising out of and in the course of
employment by the insured."'
While a Commercial employee was making a delivery on
VEPCO's premises, she slipped and fell. The Commercial em-
ployee filed suit against VEPCO. VEPCO asked that
Northbrook defend the suit under the duty to defend clause in
the liability policy that Commercial had in effect at that time.
Northbrook declined to defend the suit and also denied cover-
136. See id at 186.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. 252 Va. 265, 475 S.E.2d 264 (1996).
140. See id.
141. Id. at 267, 475 S.E.2d at 265.
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age. Ultimately, VEPCO defended the suit on its own, arguing
that the Commercial employee who was injured was its statuto-
ry employee under Virginia Code section 65.2-302 and that as a
statutory employee, the injured person's sole remedy was under
the Workers' Compensation Act."
VEPCO then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
ruling that Northbrook improperly declined to defend the per-
sonal injury lawsuit." The trial court held that Northbrook
was correct in refusing to defend VEPCO in the suit.'"
VEPCO appealed that decision, and the supreme court reversed
the decision of the trial court and entered final judgment for
VEPCO.
145
The supreme court held that the trial court erred in finding
that the employee exclusion language in the Northbrook policy
issued to Commercial allowed Northbrook to refuse to defend in
the personal injury suit." The supreme court, therefore, de-
termined that the plain and generally accepted definition of
"employee" should be utilized when construing the Northbrook
policy.' The injured employee, though a "statutory employee"
for purposes of workers compensation, was not an "employee" of
VEPCO within the plain meaning of the policy.' Relying up-
on its prior decision in American Reliance Insurance Co. v.
Mitchell,'49 the supreme court held that the definition of "em-
ployee" found in the Workers' Compensation Act would not be
applied to the terms found in an insurance policy unless the
policy specifically provided that the statutory definition was to
apply.' This ruling is consistent with the court's policy in re-
fusing to read anything into a legal writing that is not actually
there.
142. See id. at 268, 475 S.E.2d at 265.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 272, 475 S.E.2d at 267.
146. See id. at 271-72, 475 S.E.2d at 267.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. 238 Va. 543, 385 S.E.2d 583 (1989).
150. See VEPCO, 252 Va. at 271, 475 S.E.2d at 267.
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B. Enforceability of a Health Hazards Exclusion
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Monticello Insurance Co. v.
Baecher considered the issue of whether or not an insurance
company may enforce an exclusion clause described as a "health
hazard exclusion." 5' The estate of John Baecher was the own-
er of an "Owners', Landlords', and Tenants' Liability Insurance"
policy which covered property owned by the estate in Norfolk,
Virginia, and occupied by Louise Conyer and her granddaugh-
ter, Shanay Hunter. Hunter ingested lead based paint and
Conyer filed a personal injury lawsuit against the estate alleg-
ing negligence in allowing the lead based paint to le on the
premises.'52
The estate asked Monticello Insurance Company
("Monticello") to provide it with a defense in the suit.
Monticello filed a declaratory judgment action seeking'a deter-
mination that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the estate
in the personal injury action because of the health hazard ex-
clusion provisions." The trial court held that the health haz-
ard exclusion was unenforceable, accepting the arguments of
the estate and Conyer that the lead based paint was not "uti-
lized" within the plain meaning of the exclusion."M
On appeal, the supreme court looked at familiar principles of
contract and policy interpretation.'55 Specifically, the supreme
court stated that "in the absence of an ambiguity, we must
151. 252 Va. 347, 477 S.E.2d 490 (1996).
152. See id. at 349, 477 S.E.2d at 490.
153. See id. at 349, 477 S.E.2d at 491. The health hazard exclusion provided in
pertinent part:
[nlo coverage is granted by this policy for any claim or expense (includ-
ing but not limited to defense costs) for personal injury (as defined) made
by or on behalf of any person or persons directly or indirectly on account
of continuous, intermittent or repeated . . . ingestion . . . of, any sub-
stance ... where the Insured is or may be liable as a result of the
manufacture, production, extraction, sale, handling, utilization, distribu-
tion, disposal or creation by or on behalf of the Insured of such sub-
stance ....
Id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 350, 477 S.E.2d at 491. See also Floyd v. Northern Neck Ins. Co.,
245 Va. 153, 427 S.E.2d 193 (1993); Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. v. C.W. Warthen Co., 240
Va. 457, 397 S.E.2d 876 (1990).
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interpret the insurance contract by examining the language
contained therein."'58
Furthermore, the supreme court held that the exclusion was
enforceable; therefore, the insurance company had no obligation
to defend or indemnify the estate for any claims arising out of
the allegations made by Conyer and her granddaughter. 5 '
The plain language found in the exclusion is not subject to
more than one meaning; therefore, the exclusion was not am-
biguous according to the court.'
C. Failure to Cooperate by Insured
In Angstadt v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,'59 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia decided two issues. The first issue was
whether the defendants in a declaratory judgment action were
denied their right to a jury trial by the trial court's finding that
the jury was impaneled under Virginia Code section 8.01-336(E)
to decide an issue out of chancery."6 The second issue was
whether the trial court erred in entering judgment contrary to
the jury verdict.'6 ' This matter arose out of a declaratory
judgment action filed by Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. ("Atlan-
tic") against Keith Angstadt, Raymond Rask, and Multicomm
Telecommunications, Inc. ("Multicomm"), which sought a ruling
that it had no obligation to indemnify Rask and Multicomm
against a $2,000,000 judgment obtained by Angstadt.'62
The matter was fied in chancery, and the defendants asked
for a jury to be impaneled to determine issues of fact pursuant
to Virginia Code section 8.01-188.1' This request was granted
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. 254 Va. 286, 492 S.E.2d 118 (1997).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 288, 492 S.E.2d at 119.
163. See id. Virginia Code section 8.01-188 provides:
[wihen a declaration of right or the granting of further relief based there-
on shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by a jury,
such issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories,
with proper instructions by the court, whether a general verdict be re-
quired or not.
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by the trial court." The trial court then granted Atlantic's
motion for summary judgment against Angstadt, Rask, and
Multicomm. The summary judgment award was reversed by the
supreme court in Angstadt v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance
Co.," and the case was remanded to the trial court for fur-
ther proceedings."
On remand, the trial court asked the parties to frame "the
issue out of chancery [that] the jury is going to decide" and also
indicated that the jury's verdict would be advisory in na-
ture."7 The defendants did not object to this." The sole
question presented to the jury was "whether Rask willfully
failed to cooperate with Atlantic by not appearing at a sched-
uled deposition on April 26, 1993.169
During a three-day trial, the jury heard that John McGavin,
a lawyer who had been hired to defend Multicomm and Rask,
had been unsuccessful in repeated attempts to contact Rask.
The jury also heard that Atlantic sent Rask a reservation of
rights letter and that Rask was warned about possible sanc-
tions including entry of default judgment against him. The
court ordered Rask to appear for a deposition on April 26, 1993.
About four days before the deposition Rask sent McGavin a fac-
simile indicating that he would not be available for the deposi-
tion if a close family member who had suffered a stroke died.
McGavin repeatedly tried to contact Rask by telephone; howev-
er, Rask did not return any of McGavin's phone calls. Three
days before the depositions, Rask sent McGavin another fax
stating that the family member had died and that the depo-
sition..would have to be rescheduled for April 28, 1993. Rask
did not communicate with McGavin after the last facsimile.' 70
Angstadt's lawyer was informed that Rask would be available
for depositions on April 28, 1993, and not on April 26, 1993, to
which Angstadt's counsel responded that he was planning to at-
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-188 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
164. See Angstadt, 254 Va. at 288, 492 S.E.2d at 119.
165. 249 Va. 444, 457 S.E.2d 86 (1995).
166. See Angstadt, 254 Va. at 289, 492 S.E.2d at 119.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 289, 492 S.E.2d at 119-20.
1998] 1329
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1303
tend depositions on April 26, 1993, as previously scheduled at
Multicomm's offices. Angstadt's counsel also proclaimed that if
the funeral took place at the scheduled deposition time, the
depositions could be moved to another time on April 26,
1998.''
Rask testified that the funeral was set for 9:30 a.m. and that
he would have been available to attend the depositions at an-
other time that day, but he believed that the depositions had
been canceled. Rask also admitted that he never tried to con-
tact McGavin to see if and when the depositions had been re-
scheduled. The jury found that Rask "did not willfully fail to
cooperate" with counsel and Atlantic." 2 Atlantic ultimately
asked the chancellor to grant it judgment on the basis that the
jury's decision was advisory in nature or, in the alternative,
that it was contrary to the evidence.17' The chancellor agreed
with Atlantic and held that Rask "willfully failed to cooperate,"
and that he "made a deliberate, knowing, calculated and well-
advised choice to not attend [the] deposition." 1'7 4
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the defen-
dants were entitled to a binding jury verdict under Virginia
Code section 8.01-188 and determined that they were not. 5
The defendants also argued on appeal that the chancellor erred
in entering judgment contrary to the jury verdict.17 6 The su-
preme court stated that the discretionary authority of a chan-
cellor under Virginia Code section 8.01-336(E) allows him or
her to impanel a jury to decide an issue out of chancery. 7 7
Under the supreme court's previous ruling in Bowers v.
Westvaco Corp., 8 the court determined that such a jury ver-
dict is "advisory or pervasive" and is meant to "inform the con-
171. See id. at 290, 492 S.E.2d at 120.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 291, 492 S.E.2d at 120.
175. See id. at 292, 492 S.E.2d at 121.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. 244 Va. 139, 419 S.E.2d 661 (1992).
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science of the chancellor.""9 The court also cited its decision
in Dejarnette v. Brooks Lumber Co.,80 stating
[wihen the chancellor has decided the case himself, despite
the verdict of the jury and contrary to their findings, on
appeal the duty devolves upon the appellate court to exam-
ine the evidence and if in its opinion the preponderance
thereof is with the verdict the decree will be reversed and
final judgment entered in accordance with the verdict. But
where the evidence preponderates in support of the judg-
ment of the chancellor his judgment will be upheld.81
The supreme court then analyzed the meaning of the term
"willful" in the context of a "cooperation clause" and decided to
apply definitions of the term from the context of a violation of
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act 82 and from the crim-
inal law context." The supreme court concluded that "a pre-
ponderance of the evidence" supported the chancellor's decision
that Rask "willfully failed to cooperate" by failing to attend the
April 26, 1993, deposition and affirmed the chancellor's deci-
sion."
D. Nature of Sole Proprietorship for Insurance Purposes
In the case of Recalde v. ITT Hartford,8 ' the Virginia Su-
preme Court answered a certified question from the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia." The case arose out of
an automobile accident that occurred in Virginia when an em-
ployee of a cleaning service, while in the scope of his employ-
179. Angstadt, 254 Va. at 292, 492 S.E.2d at 121 (citing Bowers, 244 Va. at 147,
419 S.E.2d at 666).
180. 199 Va. 18, 97 S.E.2d 750 (1957).
181. Angstadt, 254 Va. at 292, 492 S.E.2d at 121 (quoting DeJarnette 199 Va. at
21, 97 S.E.2d at 752).
182. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-340 to -346.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
183. See Angstadt, 254 Va. at 293, 492 S.E.2d at 122. See also RF&P Corp. v.
Little, 247 Va. 309, 320, 440 S.E.2d 908, 915 (1994) (stating that conduct is "willful"
where it is intentional). The court also looked at the definition of "willful" in a non-
criminal law context in the case of United States v. Murdock as "denoting an act
which is intentional, knowing, or voluntary." 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
184. See Angstadt, 254 Va. at 293, 492 S.E.2d at 122.
185. 254 Va. 501, 492 S.E.2d 435 (1997).
186. See id. at 502, 492 S.E.2d at 436.
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ment, left the keys in a pickup truck. The truck was stolen and
latter involved in the above-mentioned accident. Subsequently,
a personal injury suit was filed against the cleaning service and
the owner of the pickup truck by the driver of the other auto-
mobile involved in the collision. Hartford provided commercial
insurance policy to the cleaning company, and the named in-
sured was "A&R Industrial Sweeping & Cleaning."'87
At some point during the pendency of the personal injury
suit, a dispute arose over the insurance coverage and a declara-
tory judgment action was filed by Recalde, trading as A&R
Sweeping and Cleaning ("A&R"), against Hartford. Specifically,
Recalde wanted a declaration that Hartford had a duty to de-
fend A&R and indemnify A&R in the personal injury action.
Recalde argued that there should be coverage for him because
the named insured was "A&R Industrial Sweeping & Cleaning."
The superior court granted summary judgment to Hartford
based upon the premise that the Hartford policy covered only
non-owned vehicles and because Recalde and A&R were one
and the same, coverage did not exist.'"
Recalde appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, which certified the following question to the supreme
court:
whether under Virginia law, for the purpose of deciding the
scope of coverage of a commercial insurance policy for inju-
ry or property damage arising from the use of a motor vehi-
cle, a sole proprietorship named as the insured is a legal
entity separate and distinct from the individual owner doing
business in that name. 189
In analyzing the matter, the supreme court evaluated who
was designated as the named insured and the two classes of
motor vehicles designated as "covered autos" in the "Business
Auto Coverage Part" of the policy.190
187. See id. at 503, 492 S.E.2d at 437.
188. See id. at 504, 492 S.E.2d at 437.
189. Id. at 502, 492 S.E.2d at 436.
190. See id. at 503-04, 492 S.E.2d at 436-37.
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As stated above, the named insured was listed as A&R In-
dustrial Sweeping & Cleaning. The "covered autos" in the policy
were designated as follows:
HIRED AUTOS ONLY. Only those autos you lease, hire,
rent or borrow. This does not include any auto you lease,
hire, rent or borrow from any of your employees or mem-
bers of their households.
NONOWNED AUTOS ONLY. Only those autos you do not
own, lease, hire or borrow which are used in connection
with your business. This includes autos owned by your
employees or members of their households but only while
used in your business or your personal affairs. 9'
The supreme court answered the certified question in the
negative "because of the definition and nature of a sole propri-
etorship."'92 The court held that "[a] sole proprietorship is [a]
form of business in which one person owns all the assets of the
business in contrast to a partnership, trust or corporation. The
sole proprietor is solely liable for all the debts of the
business." 9 ' The court found that a sole proprietorship is not
a legal entity separate and distinct from the individual owner
doing business in the name of the business."M
E. Statutory Changes-Notice of Intention to Rely on Defenses
The 1997 General Assembly rewrote Virginia Code section
38.2-2226 to provide a uniform deadline for an insurer's notifi-
cation of its intention to defend itself by questioning the validi-
ty of an insurance contract or by executing a "nonwaiver of
rights" agreement.' 5
191. Id. at 504, 492 S.E.2d at 437.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 504-05, 492 S.E.2d at 437.
194. See id. at 506, 492 S.E.2d at 438.
195. Virginia Code section 38.2-2226 now provides:
Whenever any insurer on a policy of liability insurance discovers a
breach of the terms or conditions of the insurance contract by the in-
sured, the insurer shall notify the claimant or the claimants counsel of
the breach. Notification shall be given within forty-five days after discov-
ery by the insurer of the breach or of the claim, whichever is later.
Whenever, on account of such breach, a nonwaiver of rights agreement is
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V. AUTOMOBILE MEDICAL PAY COVERAGE
In the next case to be discussed, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia provided guidance in an area that is starting to become a
hot issue among litigators across the state. With the prevalence
of HMOs and other health insurance vehicles that have negoti-
ated discounts with health care providers, the issue of incurred
expenses has been a major concern in many cases in the Com-
monwealth.
A. Definition of Incurred
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bowers96 that the term "in-
curred" includes only the amounts that a person is "legally obli-
gated to pay."'97 This case arose in the context of medical pay-
ments coverage under an automobile insurance policy issued by
State Farm to Bowers as the named insured.9 '
Bowers was involved in an automobile accident and sustained
injuries for which he sought medical treatment. He was provid-
ed health insurance by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Virginia
("Blue Cross"). The health care providers that rendered treat-
ment to Bowers all had signed contracts requiring them to
accept amounts considered "reasonable" by Blue Cross. The pro-
viders were allowed only to collect the amount offered by Blue
Cross plus any additional co-payment made by Bowers.'
Bowers submitted claims to State Farm under his medical
payments coverage. One of these claims was for $1,586, but due
to a clerical mistake, a check was sent to Bowers in the
executed by the insurer and the insured, or a reservation of rights letter
is sent by the insurer to the insured, notice of such action shall be given
to the claimant or the claimant's counsel within forty-five days after that
agreement is executed or the letter is sent, or after notice of the claim is
received, whichever is later. Failure to give the notice within forty-five
days will result in a waiver of the defense based on such breach to the
extent of the claim by operation of law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2226 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
196. 255 Va. 581, 500 S.E.2d 212 (1998).
197. Id. at 583, 500 S.E.2d at 212.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 583, 500 S.E.2d at 213.
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amount of $31,586, resulting in an overpayment of $30,000.
State Farm asked that Bowers return the $30,000, but Bowers
stated that he had already spent the entire amount of the over-
payment and refused to repay State Farm."'
Bowers indicated that one basis for his refusal to pay was
that, following the overpayment, he had incurred additional
medical expenses that he wanted to offset against the total
amount he owed to State Farm. The trial court awarded State
Farm $19,894.90, reasoning that State Farm was not allowed to
benefit from the agreement between Blue Cross and the health
care providers and allowed Bowers to offset the entire amount
of the medical bills rather than the amount that was actually
incurred.2"'
The supreme court examined the meaning of the term "in-
curred" as that term is used in the definition of medical ex-
pense.2 State Farm argued that "incurred" expenses are the
amounts that the health care providers accepted as full pay-
ment while Bowers argued that the full amount of the bills are
"incurred" amounts.2 3 The supreme court noted that it previ-
ously had decided that "an expense can only be 'incurred'...
when one has paid it or become legally obligated to pay it."2 '
The evidence at the trial level indicated that Bowers would not
be liable for any amount in excess of what Blue Cross would
pay. °5 Furthermore, the supreme court held that the trial
court erred because it granted an offset in an amount different
from what the health care providers actually accepted and that
State Farm was entitled to recover judgment in the amount of
$27,564.50.206
Therefore, unless an expense is "incurred," or paid, or there
is a legal obligation to pay, the expense cannot be claimed.
Although this decision was made in the context of medical
payments provisions, it is possible that the supreme court
200. See id.
201. See id. at 584, 500 S.E.2d at 213.
202. See id. at 585, 500 S.E.2d at 214.
203. See id.
204. Id. (citing Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692, 696,
385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1989)).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 587, 500 S.E. 2d at 215.
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would apply the same reasoning in a personal injury suit in
which the amounts claimed for injuries and damages were at
the crux of the dispute.
B. Statutory Changes
Automobile medical payments coverage was affected by the
1997 General Assembly, which amended a statute dealing with
automobile liability insurance. Specifically, the amendment
provides that in those situations where medical services are
performed but no bill for services is issued due to an existing
health care agreement, a medical expense shall be deemed to
be incurred in the amount of the usual and customary fee
charged by the provider. 0 7 More importantly, perhaps, a pro-
cedure was implemented whereby usual and customary fees
could be established by a rebuttable affidavit, subject to authen-
tication, but only if the affidavit is submitted to opposing
counsel at least twenty-one days in advance of trial."ca
207. Virginia Code section 38.2-2201(A)(3) was amended to provide:
An expense described in subdivision 1 shall be deemed to have
been incurred:
a. If the insured is directly responsible for payment of the expense;
b. If the expense is paid by (i) a health care insurer pursuant to a
negotiated contract with the health care provider or (ii) Medicaid or
Medicare, where the actual payment with reference to the medical bill
rendered by the provider is less than or equal to the provider's usual
and customary fee, in the amount of the actual payment; however, if the
insured is required to make a payment in addition to the actual payment
by the health care insurer or Medicaid or Medicare, the amount shall be
increased by the payment made by the insured;
c. If no medical bill is rendered or specific charge made by a
health care provider to the insured, an insurer, or any other person, in
the amount of the usual and customary fee charged in that community
for the service rendered.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2201(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
208. Virginia Code section 8.01-413.01(B) provides in pertinent part:
Where no medical bill is rendered or specific charge made by a health
care provider to the insured, an insurer, or any other person, the usual
and customary fee charged for the service rendered may be established
by the testimony or the affidavit of an expert having knowledge of the
usual and customary fees charged for the services rendered. If the fee is
to be established by affidavit, the affidavit shall be submitted to the
opposing party or his attorney at least twenty-one days prior to trial.
The testimony or the affidavit is subject to rebuttal and may be admitted
in the same manner as an original bill or authenticated copy described in
subsection A of this section.
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VI. INSURANCE REGULATION
A. Priority of Claims Among Creditors of Insolvent Insurer
In an appeal from the State Corporation Commission ("SCC"),
the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether or not Vir-
ginia Code section 38.2-1509 allowed a reinsurer for an insur-
ance company in receivership to obtain administrative priority
over other creditors for purposes of recovering amounts owed to
it pursuant to a contract of reinsurance with the insolvent
company. The supreme court decided in Swiss Re Life Co.
America v. Gross2" that the reinsurer was not entitled' to any
priority over other creditors of the insolvent insurer. 1 '
In Gross, Fidelity Bankers Life Insurance Company ("Fideli-
ty") sold a portion of its life insurance business to Protective
Life Insurance Company ("Protective"). Protective asked Fidelity
to provide it with an independent guarantee against potential
losses "from excess mortality claims among insureds under the
policies" purchased by Protective."' Therefore, Fidelity, Protec-
tive, and a company that is now known as Swiss, Re Life Com-
pany America ("Swiss Re"), agreed to enter into reciprocal trea-
ties of reinsurance, also known as "stop-loss" agreements."
The "stop-loss" agreements required Swiss Re to indemnify
Protective for any payments above the levels specified in mor-
tality schedules for the policies Protective obtained from Fideli-
ty, while Fidelity agreed to indemnify Swiss Re for any pay-
ments made by Swiss Re to Protective.'
Fidelity went into receivership and the SCC was appointed
receiver pursuant to Virginia Code section 38.2-1505.4 Subse-
quently, the Commissioner of Insurance was appointed as depu-
ty receiver pursuant to section 38.2-1510.1 Protective then
denfanded payments in the amount of $1,134,923 for excess
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413.01(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
209. 253 Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 857 (1997).
210. See id. at 145, 479 S.E.2d at 860.
211. Id. at 141, 479 S.E.2d at 857.
212. See idL
213. See id.
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1505 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
215. Id. § 38.2-1510.
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mortality losses in 1991 pursuant to its agreement with Swiss
Re. Swiss Re paid this amount and then made a claim with
the deputy receiver.216
Swiss Re sought priority over other creditors of Fidelity,
claiming that the amount owed to it under its agreement with
Fidelity was an administrative expense under Virginia Code
section 38.2-1509.217 The deputy receiver denied Swiss Re's
claim of administrative priority.21 s Subsequent to this decision
by the deputy receiver, Swiss Re obtained from another life
insurer various reinsurance treaties under which Fidelity was
the indemnified party, making Swiss Re both a creditor and a
debtor of Fidelity. Swiss Re sought to set off payments it owed
to Fidelity by the amounts owed to it under the treaties be-
tween Protective, Fidelity and itself. The deputy receiver would
not allow this, indicating there was a lack of mutuality.219
Swiss Re filed a petition for review and the deputy receiver
reconsidered his finding regarding the disavowal of the Fidelity
treaty, stating that the treaty "would be treated as [if] it was
never disavowed."' ° However, he did not change his determi-
nations as to the set-offs of amounts owed to Swiss Re by Fi-
delity.221
Swiss Re then appealed to the SCC, contending that it was
entitled to priority in the distribution of Fidelity's receivership
estate because the obligations of an assumed contract were
expenses of administration pursuant to Virginia Code section
38.2-1509.' Swiss Re also claimed to be entitled to interest
under the Fidelity treaty as an expense of administration.'
The SCC denied Swiss Re's claim for priority, its claim for
set-off of debts it owed to Fidelity, and its claim for inter-
216. See Gross, 253 Va. at 141, 479 S.E.2d at 857.
217. See id. at 142, 479 S.E.2d at 858.
218. See id.
219. See id., 479 S.E.2d at 859.
220. Id.
221. See id at 142-43, 479 S.E.2d at 859.
222. See id. at 143, 479 S.E.2d at 859.
223. See id.
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est.' Swiss Re filed a petition for appeal of right to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia.'
The supreme court found no merit in Swiss Re's claim for
administrative priority under Virginia Code section 38.2-
1509.' The court determined that Swiss Re was an unse-
cured creditor and that its claim would be satisfied according to
the dictates of section 38.2-1509. ' In addition, the supreme
court held that Swiss Re's claim for interest was without merit
pursuant to its decision in Metompkin Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bronson,' which held that Virginia law prohibits creditors of
an insolvent estate from earning interest on claims.'
B. State Corporation Commission's Authority to Regulate
In Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Norwest Corp., ° the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the SCC's determination
that it had no authority to regulate a product offered by
Norwest.2 1 The case arose out of an appeal of right from the
SCC by Lawyers Title. 2
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 146, 479 S.E.2d at 861. Virginia Code section 38.2-1509(BX1) pro-
vides:
The Commission shall disburse the assets of an insolvent insurer as they
become available in the following manner.
1. Pay, after reserving for the payment of the costs and expenses
of administration, according to the following priorities: (i) claims of se-
cured creditors with a perfected security interest not voidable under §
38.2-1513 to the extent of the value of their security, (ii) claims of the
associations for "covered claims" and "contractual obligations" as defined
in §§ 38.2-1603 and 38.2-1701 and claims of other policyholders arising
out of insurance contracts apportioned without preference, (iii) taxes owed
to the United States and other debts owed to any person, including the
United States, which by the laws of the United States are entitled to
priority, (iv) wages entitled to priority as provided in section 38.2-1514,
and (v) other creditors.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1509(BX1) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
227. See Gross, 253 Va. at 146, 479 S.E.2d at 861.
228. 172 Va. 494, 2 S.E.2d 323 (1939).
229. See Gross, 253 Va. at 147, 479 S.E.2d at 861 (citing Metompkin Bank, 172
Va. at 500, 2 S.E.2d at 325 (1939)).
230. 254 Va. 388, 493 S.E.2d 114 (1997).
231. See id. at 394, 493 S.E.2d at 117.
232. See id. at 390, 493 S.E.2d at 114.
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Lawyers Title filed a complaint against Norwest for the sale
of a product called Title Option Plus ("TOP"). Lawyers Title
claimed that TOP shifted the risk of title defects and, therefore,
constituted insurance subject to regulation by the SCC.'
The SCC determined that TOP was not insurance and there-
fore was not subject to being regulated by the SCC.' Law-
yers Title appealed the decision. The supreme court determined
that the SCC was correct in its characterization of the product.
The court specially agreed with the SCC in rejecting the idea
"that if a product looks like insurance, and is sold like insur-
ance, it must be insurance.""
The supreme court reviews the final orders of the SCC de
novo and presumes that the findings of the SCC are "just, rea-
sonable, and correct.""8 This presumption, in the absence of
clear and-convincing proof from the appellant, will tend to re-
sult in the court upholding the SCC's findings. This trend was
demonstrated in the cases discussed above.
VII. FIRE INSURANCE
In K&W Builders v. Merchants and Business Men's Mutual
Insurance Co., 7 the Supreme Court of Virginia looked at the
question of whether an "innocent co-insured" was precluded
from coverage by the fraudulent or dishonest acts of other
insureds. 8 In this case, Merchants and Business Men's Mu-
tual Insurance Co. ("Merchants") issued a fire insurance policy
which provided coverage to a building owned by K&W and
occupied by Ahmad Thiab ("Thiab") and A&N Food, Inc.
("A&N"). The policy listed Thiab and A&N as named insureds
and K&W as an additional insured. 9
233. See id.
234. See id., 493 S.E.2d at 115.
235. Id. at 394, 493 S.E.2d at 117.
236. See Bralley-Wllett v. Holtzman Oil, 216 Va. 888, 890, 223 S.E.2d 892, 895
(1976).
237. 255 Va. 5, 495 S.E.2d 473 (1998).
238. See id. at 12, 495 S.E.2d at 477.
239. See id. at 7, 495 S.E.2d at 474.
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The building was used to operate a restaurant that was sub-
sequently destroyed by fire. K&W filed a motion for judgment
against Merchants, seeking recovery of the face amount of the
policy, but Merchants denied the claim after it discovered evi-
dence that the fire had been set by Thiab or A&N. Merchants
claimed that Thiab and/or A&N had violated the policy terms,
rendering the policy null and void as to all insureds.'
The jury in the trial found that the fire had been set by
Thiab and A&N and that they made material misrepresenta-
tions to Merchants. The trial court entered judgment on behalf
of Merchants, and K&W appealed."
Relying on its previous decision in Rockingham Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Hummel, 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined that K&W, Thiab, and A&N all had the joint duty not to
defraud the insurer and to refrain from committing dishonest or
criminal acts.' If any one of the joint insureds violated those
duties, the breach was chargeable to the other insureds, thus
preventing their recovery under the policy.'
K&W argued that its interests and the interests of the other
co-insureds were severable and, therefore, that K&W should not
be held accountable for the actions of Thiab and A&N.2" The
supreme court indicated that even absent a joint interest be-
tween the insureds, and notwithstanding K&W's innocence, the
policy language disallowed coverage for all insureds based upon
the acts of any co-insured.' The judgment of the trial court
was affirmed. 7
VIII. HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE
In cases decided by both the United States Court. of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
240. See id. at 1, 495 S.E.2d at 474-75.
241. See id. at 8, 495 S.E.2d at 475.
242. 219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d 774 (1979).
243. See K&W Builders, 255 Va. at 12, 495 S.E.2d at 477.
244. See id
245. See id. at 9, 495 S.E.2d at 475.
246. See id. at 10, 495 S.E.2d at 476.
247. See id. at 13, 495 S.E.2d at 478.
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garding homeowner's policies, the courts determined that an
examination under oath clause allows an insurer to investigate
the origins of a fire during an examination under oath and that
collateral estoppel does not apply to an insurer litigating a
declaratory judgment action.
A- Scope of Examination Under Oath Clause
In Powell v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that
an examination under oath clause249 in the insurance policy
allowed an investigation into possible motives for suspected
arson and was not limited to an investigation of the losses
claimed by the insureds.25 The case was originally filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as a de-
claratory judgment action seeking a determination that the
examination under oath clause of U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty's
("USF&G") policy was limited to an investigation of the extent
of the claimed loss and did not include investigation or the
causes or origins of the loss. The plaintiffs also sought compen-
satory and punitive damages for alleged bad faith on the part
of USF&G." 1
The district court dismissed the portion of the action that
sought damages for bad faith because such damages were un-
available under Virginia law. 2 The district court subse-
quently awarded USF&G summary judgment on the issue of
the scope of the examination under oath clause. The Powells
appealed the decision. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holdings in all respects' determining that the exami-
nation under oath clause includes permitted investigation into
possible motives for suspected fraud.'
248. 88 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 1996).
249. The homeowner's policy provided that the insured will "submit to questions
under oath and sign and swear to them." Id.
250. See id. at 274.
251. See id. at 272.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 272, 274.
254. See id. at 273; see also Pisa v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 787 F. Supp.
282 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 966 F.2d 1440 (1st Cir. 1992).
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B. Collateral Estoppel
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mabry,"5 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia determined whether a homeowner's
"insurer was estopped from litigating whether the insured's acts
were negligent or intentional based upon a judgment in a prior
tort action in which the insurer provided the insured a defense
under a reservation of rights." 6 In this case, Hermond Mabry
("Mabry") shot Helena Martin ("Martin") at Mabry's residence.
Martin notified State Farm of the event and State Farm issued
a reservation of rights letter to both Martin and Mabry indicat-
ing that coverage may not be available due to the intentional
act exclusion in the homeowner's policy." '
Martin filed a motion for judgment against Mabry seeking
$125,000 in damages for Mabry's alleged negligence in shooting
her.' Although State Farm sent another reservation of rights
letter to Mabry and Martin's counsel, State Farm hired counsel
to represent Mabry in the tort action."
State Farm filed a declaratory judgment motion seeking a
determination that the policy provisions excluded coverage for
Mabry's acts.' Before the declaratory judgment action could
be decided, Mabry and Martin agreed to the entry of a consent
judgment against Mabry. The trial court held that State Farm
was estopped from litigating the question of whether Mabry's
acts were intentional or negligent.6 1 The trial court entered a
final order declaring that State Farm had to provide coverage
to Mabry and that State Farm had an obligation to pay the
judgment in the underlying tort action.262 State Farm ap-
pealed, arguing that the trial court's decision -was based upon
an improper application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
255. 255 Va. 286, 497 S.E.2d 844 (1998).
256. Id. at 288, 497 S.E.2d at 845.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 288-89, 497 S.E.2d at 845.
261. See id. at 289, 497 S.E.2d at 845.
262. See id.
1998] 1343
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1303
The supreme court agreed with State Farm that collateral
estoppel was not available in this case.2" For collateral
estoppel to apply, "the parties, or their privies, must be the
same in both the prior and subsequent actions."2" The su-
preme court determined that State Farm was not a party to the
tort litigation and that the requisite privity did not exist be-
tween State Farm and Mabry; therefore, collateral estoppel did
not apply.285
263. See id. at 289, 497 S.E.2d at 846.
264. See id. (citing Angstadt v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 249 Va. 444, 446, 457
S.E.2d 86, 87 (1995)).
265. Id. at 290, 497 S.E.2d at 846.
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